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Articles
Getting the Lead Out:
How Public Nuisance Law Protects
Rhode Island's Children
Aileen Sprague and Fidelma Fitzpatrick*

INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 2006, a jury of Rhode Islanders delivered a
decisive verdict in a case that had been the source of significant
political, social, and economic debate since it was filed in 1999.
On that day, a jury of six, who had devoted more than four months
of their lives hearing evidence in the longest civil jury trial in
Rhode Island's history,' delivered a victory for the people of the
* Aileen Laurie Sprague - Associate Attorney, Motley Rice LLC,
Providence, RI. B.A. 1994, Fairfield University; J.D. 2001, Northeastern
University School of Law.
Fidelma L. Fitzpatrick - Member, Motley Rice LLC, Providence, RI. B.A.
1991, Canisius College; J.D. 1994, Washington College of Law, American
University.
This article is the culmination of more than six years of hard and innovative
work by the Rhode Island Lead Trial Team of which we are proud members.
Many thanks to Jack McConnell, Bob McConnell, Laura Holcomb, Michael
Rousseau, Jonathan Orent, Michaela McInnis, Michael Marran, Karl Smith,
Neil F.X. Kelly, Genevieve Allaire-Johnson, Parisa Beers, Neil Leifer and
Michael Lesser. Thanks also to former Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse
for courageously initiating this lawsuit on behalf of all Rhode Islanders, to
Attorney General Patrick Lynch for confirming the importance of the case by
supporting it when he assumed the office, and to Linn Freedman for her
efforts in moving the case forward. Finally, we thank our families for their
love and support.

603

604 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:603
State of Rhode Island by rendering a verdict determining that: (1)
the presence of lead pigments in paints throughout Rhode Island
was a public nuisance; (2) three former manufacturers, suppliers,
and promoters of lead pigments - Sherwin Williams, Millennium
Holdings, and NL Industries (hereinafter "Lead manufacturers" or
"Defendants") - were liable for that public nuisance; and (3) the
responsible defendants were required to abate the existing
2
nuisance.
The factual premise of the State's suit was simple. It
recognized that lead poisoning poses a very serious risk to a large
3
percentage of children under six years of age in Rhode Island.
The primary reason that lead poisoning has such a widespread
adverse impact on the health of Rhode Island children is that lead
is still present in and on homes and buildings throughout our
state despite the fact that it was banned for residential use in the
United States in 1978. 4 Furthermore, the action recognized that
the manufacturers of lead products used in paint (hereinafter
"Lead") and their trade association were responsible for this harm
to Rhode Islanders because they manufactured and promoted
Lead for use in and on homes and buildings throughout the State
of Rhode Island despite their knowledge of its toxicity.5 In short,

the Defendants knew Lead was dangerous but continued to sell it
in Rhode Island.6 In addition, they also failed to warn parents,

1. See Peter B. Lord, Jurors in Lead-Paint Trial Say They're Proud of
Verdict, THE PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 12, 2006, at B1 (noting that "court officials
believe [the trial] was the longest civil trial in state history.")
2. Rhode Island v. Atd. Richfield Co., C.A.No. 99-5226, Jury Verdict
Form, Feb. 22, 2006 [hereinafter "Jury Verdict Form"].
3. See R.I. KIDS COUNT, R.I. KIDS COUNT FACT BOOK 66 (2005).
4. See 16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (2005) ("the Consumer Product Safety
Commission declares that paint and similar surface-coating materials for
consumer use containing lead or lead compounds... are banned hazardous
products.. .". See also Official Morning Trial Transcript at 57, Rhode Island
v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 14, 2005).
5. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 4-5, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Feb. 10, 2006) (wherein counsel for the State
argued in closing arguments that "these four defendants knew that their lead
products were hazardous to kids, they knew that their lead pigment could
permanently hurt kids, they knew that it caused brain damage, they knew it
killed kids, and they even knew how it happened. And they chose to sell it
anyway.").
6. Id. at 35-36 (closing argument from State's counsel that "[tihese
defendants I just mentioned [NL, ARCO and Millennium Holdings] were told
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homeowners, or the public about the dangers of lead based paint.
For decades, many groups, including State government,
homeowners and landlords, parents, and child health and housing
advocates, worked to solve the lead poisoning problem in Rhode
Island. Through the litigation, after years of bearing the burden
of this public health scourge, the Attorney General and the State
sought to have the Lead manufacturers share their responsibility
s
for the lead poisoning crisis in Rhode Island.
The legal premise was also simple. The State maintained
that the Lead manufacturers had created an environmental

that kids were poisoned by lead in paint, and instead of embracing them,
treating them, or offering to remove the toxic substance from their kids
homes, they continued to promote their lead without even a whisper of the
hazard. They poured more money into pro lead ads and more resources and
did the [sic] into the promotion of lead to increase their sales. And all that
add layers and layers of paints in our homes today that need to be abated.")
See also Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 46-48, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 12, 2005); Official Trial Transcript at 94-95,
Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Jan. 13, 2006).
7. Official Morning Trial Transcript at 32-33, Rhode Island v. Atd.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 1, 2005); see also Unofficial Afternoon Trial
Transcript at 32, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Feb. 10,
2006) (closing arguments from State's counsel arguing that "The defendants
chose, they chose not to educate people about the dangers of their product.
The defendants chose not to substitute safe alternatives. The defendants
chose not to warn. The defendants chose to recklessly promote, and the
defendants chose to downplay the hazards.")
8. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 58, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Feb. 10, 2006) (state's closing argument stating
"It's right, it's right, Ladies and Gentlemen, for the defendants to assume
their responsibility after standing by and watching others carry it for so
long."); Unofficial Morning Trial Transcript at 62, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Feb. 9, 2006) (state's counsel arguing in closing
that "[the State, homeowners, parents] are the ones who are responsible for
the public health success story. It's taken care of 75 percent of the children
who were still lead poisoned-who were lead poisoned. But 25 percent of
children are left. 25 percent of children who were lead poisoned ten years ago
are still getting lead poisoned today and that's not okay. And so what we're
here saying is, it's these defendants, these defendants should come and help
share that responsibility."); Official Morning Trial Transcript at 97, Rhode
Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 1, 2005) (opening statements
from State's counsel that "[t]he State has taken responsibility. Taxpayers
Parents have taken
and homeowners have taken responsibility.
responsibility. We are that temporary Band-Aid, the cover up, the treatment.
But there's one group that has never contributed to the solution. This trial is
about telling the defendants it's time to help fix the lead paint problem they
created once and for all.")
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hazard which they, like all who pollute the environment, should
clean up. The case was brought under the common law claim of
public nuisance, which imposes liability on those who
"unreasonabl[y] interfere[] with a right common to the general
public" such as the "the health, safety, peace, comfort or
convenience of the general community." 9 Public nuisance law
allowed the State to pursue the public health remedy of
abatement, which "means the public nuisance is to be rendered
harmless or suppressed." 10 Such a remedy would work toward a
goal of primary prevention by protecting children before they are
poisoned. Leading public health advocates have maintained that
this strategy is essential to preventing lead poisoning in the
future.1 ' As the Centers for Disease Control recently concluded,
the "answer to lead poisoning is prevention. The alternative of
intervening only after a child has been harmed is unacceptable
and serves neither the interests of the child nor the property

9. Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59 (R.I.
1980) (quoting Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971
(N.Y. 1977)).
10. Official Morning Trial Transcript at 131, Rhode Island v. At.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Feb. 13, 2006).
11. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children 4
(2005) ("Because lead-based paint is the most important source of lead
exposure for young children, the first essential element of primary prevention
is implementation of strategies to control lead paint-contaminated house dust
and soil and poorly maintained lead paint in housing."); U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Preventing
Lead
Poisoning
in
Young
Children
(1991),
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/Publications/books/plpyc/contents.htm
("Eradicating childhood lead poisoning requires a long-term active program of
primary lead-poisoning prevention, including abatement of lead-based paint
hazards in homes, day-care centers, and other places where young children
play and live."); President's Task Force on Envtl. Health Risks and Safety
Risks to Children, U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Eliminating
Childhood Lead Poisoning: A Fed. Strategy Targeting Lead Paint Hazards 35
(2000) ("The most important part of the treatment of childhood lead poisoning
is the identification and elimination of the sources of lead exposure. In
addition, case management services are needed to coordinate interventions
related to environmental, housing, medical, and social factors."); id. at 6
("The benefit of permanently abating lead paint is considerably greater
because more children would benefit over a considerable longer time span.
The quantified monetary benefits may underestimate the actual benefits
because of the many unquantifiable benefits associated with eliminating
childhood lead paint poisoning.")
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owner nor future generations of children." 12
On February 13, 2006, after nearly ten weeks of receiving
evidence, the trial court gave jury instructions which covered the
law of public nuisance, among other things. 13 After eight days of
deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the
State. 14 Post-verdict interviews with the jurors revealed that the
process was a perfect example of the way the jury system in the
United States is supposed to work: the jurors recounted that they
put aside their own philosophical and social beliefs and applied
only the facts they heard during trial to the law as it was given to
them.'5

The verdict, which was the culmination of the jurors'
scrupulous adherence to the law and facts presented in the case,
should have put an end to the heated social and political debate
that surrounded the suit since its inception in 1999.16 Instead, the

12. Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction and Financing Task Force, U.S.
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Putting the Pieces Together: Controlling
Lead Hazards in the Nation's Hous. 8 (1993).
13. Official Trial Transcript at 124-32, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
No. 99-5226 (Feb. 13, 2006).
14. Jury Verdict Form, supra note 2.
15. See Lord, supra note 1, at B4 (reporting that "the jurors said they
carefully followed the judge's instructions to focus only on the evidence."). See
also Peter Krouse, Verdict Raises Risk for Paint Companies, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 2, 2006, at Al.
16. Throughout the course of the litigation, the issue drew strong
opinions from lead poisoning prevention groups and public health advocates
on one hand and groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, local realtors
associations, and newspaper editorial writers on the other. See Neil Gendel,
Letter to the Editor, Hit oil companies after paint makers, THE PROVIDENCE
J., Apr. 7, 2006, at B5 ("the people who represent us are catching up to the
successors of the manufacturers and sellers of a product [leaded paint] known
to be inherently dangerous to our health."); See Edward Achorn, Bizarre,
Unfair Lead-PaintRuling, THE PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4, 2006 (saying that the
verdict "on its face seem unjust"); See Julie Creswell, The Nuisance That May
Cost Billions, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, at Sec. 3 (noting that "the
jury's decision was particularly shocking"); See Jack McConnell, Why
judgment on lead paint was right, THE PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 17, 2006
("[c]learly, lead poisoning is a public nuisance in Rhode Island"); See
Providence Journal Editorial Staff, Blaming the wrong people, THE
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 6, 2006 (noting that bad landlords were the real causes
of lead poisoning in Rhode Island); See Editorials, Lead paint decisions show
clear reasoning, PROVIDENCE BUSINESS NEWS, Mar. 6-12, 2006, at 28; See
Editorial, Motley Legal Crew, WALL STREET J., Feb. 27, 2006, at A14 ("There
are so many screwy aspects to this case that it's hard to know where to
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verdict fueled more heated debates, especially in light of the large
decrease in the value of the publicly traded Defendants - Sherwin
17
Williams and NL Industries - that accompanied the verdict.
Corporate interests have flooded the media with criticism of the
jurors' work, questioning the decision that they reached, the
manner in which the trial justice conducted the litigation, and
even the wisdom of Rhode Island's well-established public
8
nuisance law.'
While this litigation has been described as "historic,"19 the
progress the State of Rhode Island has made against corporations
who have successfully immunized themselves from liability for
more than twenty years through aggressive litigation strategy and
scorched earth discovery 20 has also been historic. 2' While this

begin."); See Jane E. Brody, Dally No Longer: Get the Lead Out, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at F6 ("no one at any level of society, not even
those with seven-figure incomes, can afford to be complacent about the
exposure of children to lead in home and play environments.")
17. See Creswell, supra note 16 ("It was a surprising and devastating
verdict for the industry, and the reaction was swift and severe. The stocks of
the paint companies tumbled, wiping out billions of dollars in market value
that afternoon."); Peter B. Lord, 3 Companies Found Liable in Lead Paint
Nuisance Suit, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Feb. 23, 2006, at Al
("The value of Sherwin Williams stock began to plummet within moments of
the verdict. By the end of the day, the value of the company's shares dropped
by nearly 18 percent-a loss totaling $1.3 billion. The value of NL Industries
stock dropped by 8 percent, for a total loss of $642 million.").
18. See Creswell, supra note 16 ("The defense lawyers ... blame what
they call Rhode Island's quirky public nuisance laws. They also contend that
the judge overseeing this case had severely limited their ability to gather
evidence and present a defense, and say that he may have given erroneous
instructions to the jury.")
19. See Peter B. Lord, In a Surprise Move, Defense Rests in Lead-Paint
Trial, THE PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 26, 2006, at B1.
20. Throughout the course of preparation for the November 2005 trial,
the defendants deposed between 140 and 160 Rhode Island landlords,
homeowners, and parents and hundreds of other fact and expert witnesses.
In addition, they requested and received millions of pages of documents from
Rhode Island departments, such as the Departments of Health,
Environmental Management, Administration, Human Services, Office of the
Governor, Office of the Attorney General, Business Regulation, and
Corrections, and the General Assembly.
21. In 1987, the first case filed against the lead industry was a personal
injury suit brought under the theory of market share liability. In Santiago v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., the First Circuit declined to overturn the lower court's
ruling that market share liability does not apply in Massachusetts. Santiago
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir. 1993). Several other
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verdict represents a break from the past, the legal and factual
premise of the State's case has deep roots in Rhode Island's legal
tradition. The Attorney General's responsibility to bring this type
of action, as well as the controlling law of public nuisance, is wellgrounded in over a century of Rhode Island jurisprudence. The
concept of public nuisance is not a landmark or novel cause of
action; it is firmly rooted in the common law, with cases in Rhode
Island dating back to 1800s. 22 Furthermore, the law of Rhode
Island in this regard is not idiosyncratic or different from public
nuisance law around the country. Not only is there significant
historical precedent nationwide for Rhode Island's suit, but other
courts around the country that have also considered the
applicability of public nuisance law to the lead poisoning crisis
and the conduct of these defendants have issued decisions
23
mirroring those of the Rhode Island Superior Court.
Part I of this Article provides an extensive overview of the
public nuisance claim, explores that claim's deep roots in Rhode
Island law and refutes arguments typically made against applying
public nuisance to remedy communal harms, such as lead
poisoning. Part II discusses the significance of the Rhode Island
verdict and discusses the remedies that the State will make on
behalf of the Rhode Islanders. Part III provides an overview of
successful cases brought in other states by government entities
against the Lead defendants. The Article concludes that these
companies will no longer be able to use carefully crafted legal
defenses to shield themselves from responsibility for the lead
poisoning crisis that plagues the country and its children.
similar personal injury suits filed in Massachusetts, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania were either voluntarily or involuntarily dismissed in the mid
1990s after the negative ruling in Santiago. These rulings, based on
principles of product liability law, paved the way for the public nuisance
cause of action filed by the State of Rhode Island in October 1999. Other
governmental entities have filed similar public nuisance suits against the
lead industry since 1999.
22. See Simmons v. Cornell, 1 R.I. 519 (1851); Hughes v. Providence &
W.R. Co., 2 R.I. 493 (Sept. term. 1853); State v. Johnson, 3 R.I. 94 (1855);
State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. 497 (1858); Clark v. Peckham, 10 R.I. 35 (1871);
Thornton v. Grant, 10 R.I. 477 (1873); Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210 (1875).
23. See In Re Lead Paint Litigation, No. A-1946-02T3, 2005 WL 1994172,
at *14 (N.J. Super. A.D. Aug. 17, 2005); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc.,
691 N.W. 2d 888, 893 (Wisc. App. 2004); County of Santa Clara v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 348 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2006).
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I.

RHODE ISLAND'S PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM

A. The State's Claim Is Consistent with Almost a Century of
Rhode Island Precedent
The filing of this litigation in 1999 against the Lead
manufacturers was not based on a long shot theory of public
nuisance that has never been previously applied to environmental
torts affecting the public at large. Public nuisance has long been
utilized by the Attorney General to bring suits on behalf of the
24
public to remedy public harms.
Rhode Island courts have recognized the exhaustive common
law authority of the Attorney General to commence suit to redress
public harms:
In this state it was long ago settled that '[s]uits for the
public should be placed in public and responsible
hands.'.

.

. The public officer vested with that authority is

the attorney general of the state. Only he may sue to
25
redress a purely public wrong.

24. The Rhode Island Attorney General's responsibility to prosecute
public nuisances injurious to the health and welfare of residents of the State
is consistent with authority from the majority of jurisdictions across the
country. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1893) (state's police power
includes "everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and [I
justiflies] the destruction or abatement.., of whatever may be regarded as a
public nuisance"); People v. Nebbia, 186 N.E. 694, 699 (N.Y. 1933); Minnesota
ex rel. Humphrey v. Standard Oil Co., 568 F. Supp. 556, 563 (D. Minn. 1983)
("the parens patriaedoctrine allows a state to maintain a legal action where
state citizens have been harmed, where the state maintains a quasi-sovereign
interest. A state maintains a quasi-sovereign interest []where the health
and well-being of its residents is affected. . .") (internal citations omitted);
State ex rel. Patterson v. Warren, 180 So.2d 293, 299 (Miss. 1965) (at
common law, the attorney general had inherent authority "to institute
proceedings to abate public nuisances, affecting public safety and
convenience, to control and manage all litigation on behalf of the state, and to
intervene in all actions which were of concern to the general public");
Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 837 (Ill. 1981);
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 885 (Pa. 1974) ("The
power of the Attorney General to abate public nuisances is an adjunct of the
inherent police power of the Commonwealth.").
25. McCarthy v. McAloon, 83 A.2d 75, 78 (R.I. 1951) (internal citations
omitted). See also Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL
345830, at *3 (R.I. Super. Apr. 2, 2001) ("the Attorney General's authority in
bringing this action is comprised of that which existed at common law, as
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Further, the Attorney General's authority to maintain such
actions is also derived from the Rhode Island Constitution and the
Rhode Island General Laws. The Constitution reserves for the
Attorney General all of the duties and powers of the office as they
existed at the time the Constitution was adopted. 26 Since the
power and responsibility to prosecute public nuisance actions
existed in the Office of Attorney General prior to the adoption of
the Constitution, it remains one of the office's constitutionally
proscribed duties.2 7 Similarly, R.I.G.L. § 42-9-5 provides that the
"attorney general shall commence and prosecute to final judgment
and execution those other legal or equitable processes, and shall
perform those other duties which are or may be required of him or
her by law; except insofar as he or she may have been required to
act as the legal officer of the department of health, those functions
are hereby transferred to the chief counsel of the division of legal
services of the department of health."28 Historically, the Attorney

General of Rhode Island has prosecuted companies for conduct
that has put the health and welfare of the citizens of Rhode Island
29
at risk.
well as that allowed by statute."); Pine v. Vinagro, No. PC 95-4928, 1996 WL
937004, at *20 (R.I. Super. Nov. 4, 1996) ("Among the awesome
responsibilities of the Attorney General is that of prosecuting a public
nuisance...").
26. See Motolla v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421, 424 (R.I. 2002) ("Pursuant to
article 9, section 12, of the Rhode Island Constitution, the duties and powers
of the Attorney General remained the same under the Constitution as existed
at the time the Constitution was adopted, 'or as from time to time may be
prescribed by law."'); Suitor v. Nugent, 199 A.2d 722, 723 (R.I. 1964) ("The
constitution did not purport to create such an office [of Attorney General], but
recognized it as existing and provided for continuance of the powers and
duties exercised by its occupant prior to the adoption of the constitution.").
27. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2003 WL
1880120, at *3 (R.I. Super. Mar. 20, 2003) (the "common law equity power as
to public nuisances [was] vested in the Attorney General even prior to the
adoption of our State Constitution."); Greenough v. Indus. Trust Co., 82 A.
266, 266 (R.I. 1912) (recognizing an "information in equity brought in the
superior court by the Attorney General, in behalf of the state, to abate a
public nuisance.. ."); Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210, 212 (1875).
28. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-9-5 (1993). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-9-6
(1993).
29. See Pine v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-0346B, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21043,
at *14 (D.R.I. Aug. 23, 1993) (wherein the Attorney General sued Shell Oil
company under public nuisance claim after a service station released
hydrocarbons into the environment, polluting ground water); Wood v. Picillo,
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Under Rhode Island law, public nuisance is defined
expansively as "an unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public: it is behavior that unreasonably interferes
with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the
general community." 30 An interference can be considered
"unreasonable" if:
the conduct involves a significant interference with the
public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort or the public convenience, or [] the conduct
is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation, or [I the conduct is of a continuing nature or
has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as
the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant
31
effect upon the public right.
In considering the elements a plaintiff would have to prove to
establish that some instrumentality was an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court noted that "liability in nuisance is
predicated upon unreasonable injury rather than unreasonable
conduct." 32 Therefore, pursuant to Rhode Island precedent, the
plaintiff bringing the nuisance claim must "demonstrate the
existence of the nuisance, and that injury has been caused by the
33
nuisance complained of."

443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.I. 1982) (wherein the Attorney General sued property
owners under public nuisance as a result of chemical disposal operations at
their property and sought to have them finance cleanup and removal of toxic
wastes); Whitehouse v. New England Ecological Dev., Inc., No. 98-4525, 1999
WL 1001188, at *6 (R.I. Super. Oct. 28, 1999) (wherein the Attorney General
sued solid waste disposal company under public nuisance alleging that their
excessive disposal of out-of-state waste in Rhode Island constitutes a public
nuisance).
30. Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59 (R.I.
1980) (citing Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971
(N.Y. 1977)).
31. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979).
32. Wood, 443 A.2d at 1247. See also Braun v. lannotti, 175 A. 656, 657
(R.I. 1934) ("[in cases of damages by nuisance it is considered that the
injurious consequences resulting from the nuisance, rather than the act
which produces the nuisance, is the cause of action. . .") (internal citations
omitted).
33. Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake, 420 A.2d at 59. (internal
citations omitted).
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Public nuisance law also addresses the issue of liability. The
social impact and the benefits of living in an ordered society
require those who do harm that rises to the level of a public
nuisance to remediate that harm to the public, even if it that
harm was done innocently. To prove liability, the State had to
show that the Defendants participated in creating or maintaining
the public nuisance, not that lead pigment was a defective product
or that Defendants' participation was tortious. Here, the trial
court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "One is subject
to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he
carries on the activity, but also when he participates to a
substantial extent in carrying it on." 34

Significantly, liability for a public nuisance is not premised on
tort-based notions of fault or negligence. Instead, public nuisance
is more akin to a strict or absolute liability claim because it is not
fault-based. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has found:
Distinguished from negligence liability, liability in
nuisance is predicated upon unreasonable injury rather
than upon unreasonable conduct. Thus, plaintiffs may
recover in nuisance despite the otherwise nontortious
nature of the conduct which creates the injury.
Generally, this court has not required plaintiffs to
35
establish negligence in nuisance actions.
34. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2005 WL 1331196, at
*2 (R.I. Super. June 3, 2005); Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226,
2001 WL 345830, at *7 (R.I. Super. Apr. 2, 2001) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 (1979)). In addition, the court adopted comment (d)
to § 834, which states "when a person is only one of several persons
participating in carrying on an activity, his participation must be substantial
before he can be held liable for the harm resulting from it. This is true
because to be a legal cause of harm a person's conduct must be a substantial
factor in bringing it about." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. d
(1979). The court further found that "[also of significance is the provision of
comment (e) to the effect that if the activity engaged in lead to the creation
rather than to the maintenance of the nuisance, the actor who carried on the
activity '. . . or who participated to a substantial extent in the activity is

subject to the liability for a nuisance, for the continuing harm.' This is so
even after he has withdrawn from the activity and even if he is not in a
position to stop the harm, or to abate the condition." Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2005
WL 1331196, at *2. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 834 cmt. e
(1979).

35.

Wood, 443 A.2d at 1247-48 (internal citations omitted). See also New
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This important distinction between nuisance and negligence
liability underscores the inapplicability of product liability
concepts - both affirmative requirements and defenses thereto to public nuisance suits.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized for almost a
century that public nuisance provides a cause of action in
environmental contamination and pollution cases. For example,
in Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., our highest court
considered whether a manufacturer that polluted public and/or
private waters could be found liable for creating a public
nuisance. 36 In concluding the manufacturer could be found liable,
the court stated:
[AIny manufacturer who allows his deleterious waste
product to contaminate the waters of the State, be they
public or private, is liable to any person who is injured
thereby in his private capacity and apart from being
merely one of the public, provided he can trace to its
37
origin the noxious substance whereby he is damaged.
Furthermore, in 1982, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
issued a seminal opinion considering the applicability of public
nuisance to a modern environmental contamination and pollution
case. 38 Wood v. Picillo set the tone for the application of public
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that
liability for public nuisance exists "irrespective of negligence or fault");
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 968
(West. Dist. N.Y. 1989) ("'fault is not an issue, the inquiry being limited to
whether the condition created, not the conduct creating it, is causing damage
to the public") (quoting State v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d
971, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)); Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. City of
Philadelphia, 643 F. Supp. 713, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("At common law, neither
individuals nor municipalities have the right to maintain for any period of
time activities that constitute a public nuisance, irrespective of lack of fault
or due care."); Branch v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 274 (Utah 1982)
(public nuisance "is not centrally concerned with the nature of the conduct
causing the damage, but with the nature and relative importance of the
interests interfered with or invaded.").
36. 77 A. 145, 151 (R.I. 1910).
37. Id. See also Braun v. Iannotti, 189 A. 25 (1937) (public nuisance
created by emitting smoke and soot from a smokestack).
38. See Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing
Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 214-15 (1996)
(recognizing Rhode Island was one of the first states to uphold a public
nuisance claim in a modern hazardous waste contamination case).
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nuisance law to environmental hazard cases. 39 In Wood, the
Attorney General commenced a private and public nuisance suit
against certain defendants who owned and maintained a
hazardous waste dump on their property. 40 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the "essential element of an actionable
nuisance is that persons have suffered harm or are threatened
with injuries that they ought not have to bear."41 In applying this

public nuisance law to the facts of the case, the Court upheld the
trial court's determination that the defendants' conduct
constituted a public nuisance because their storage of the
hazardous and toxic waste on the defendant's private property
42
posed a threat to the health of both aquatic wildlife and humans.
Public nuisance law in Rhode Island, with its rich, wellreasoned decisions and clear holdings with respect to
environmental torts, was clearly applicable to the factual scenario
of the serious environmental and health problem facing all Rhode
Islanders, especially the state's children, from lead poisoning.
Moreover, the unique and powerful authority entrusted to the
Attorney General to bring nuisance suits to prosecute threats and
injuries against the public health, safety and welfare predated the
adoption of the Rhode Island Constitution. The Attorney General
can therefore draw from this authority to support the state's
public nuisance claim against the Lead manufacturers.
B. Legal Challenges to a Modern Application of Public Nuisance
To Lead Pigment
Despite
the seemingly simple
and straightforward
pronouncement of public nuisance law in Rhode Island,
Defendants raised a series of seemingly endless questions
concerning the bounds of the public nuisance law. First, the Lead
manufacturers raised a host of questions at the outset of the
litigation on motions to dismiss, urging the trial court to dismiss
the complaint for following reasons: (1) these Defendants cannot
be liable for a public nuisance because they are not in current
control of the property upon which the nuisance is found; (2)
39. 443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.I. 1982).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1247-49.
42. Id. at 1248.
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manufacturers of products cannot be held liable for a public
43
nuisance; and (3) lead poisoning is a private, not a public, issue.
The trial court rejected each of these arguments, permitting the
44
State's claims to go forward.
Following failed attempts to dismiss the case at the pleading
stage, the Defendants also engaged in significant motion practice
throughout the litigation aimed at aborting the Attorney General's
suit. Though the legal arguments were ultimately unsuccessful,
they provide an interesting framework for considering the
boundaries of public nuisance law and its interplay with products
liability law. In addition to those identified above at the pleading
stage, Defendants presented the following issues to the trial court
during the course of the trial: (1) whether the Rhode Island Lead
Poisoning Prevention Act pre-empts the Attorney General's
constitutional, statutory and common law authority to bring a
public nuisance action; (2) whether the State is required to
identify the presence of particular lead pigment on particular
walls to succeed in its public nuisance claim; and (3) whether a
manufacturer of a legal product can be held liable for a public
nuisance.
1.

The Defendants'Motion to Dismiss

In lengthy written and oral arguments, the Defendants raised
a host of issues seeking to dismiss the complaint in its entirety,
including the public nuisance claim. When considered in light of
prevailing public nuisance law, the trial court's rejection of the
defendants' arguments against the State's public nuisance claim is
easily understood. First, public nuisance law in Rhode Island and
throughout the country squarely holds that those who either
created or contributed to the creation of a public nuisance may be
liable for that nuisance despite the fact that they are not in
physical control of the real property in question. In Friends of
Sakonnet v. Dutra, the United States Federal District Court for
the State of Rhode Island found that Rhode Island law does not
bar a public nuisance claim against a defendant that no longer
controls the property in question:
This Court has discovered no Rhode Island (or other)
43. State v. Lead Ind. Ass'n, 2001 WL 345830 (R.I. Super. Apr. 2, 2001).
44. Id.
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precedent that bars recovery of nuisance damages simply
because
the defendants
no longer
control
the
instrumentality alleged to have caused the nuisance. If
Rhode Island courts allow suits for nuisance damages to
go forward although the nuisance itself has already been
abated, it follows that suits should be allowed.., against
one who is alleged to have caused damages by a nuisance
even if that person no longer controls the alleged
45
nuisance.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court and Rhode Island's federal
district court have applied this principle to numerous public
nuisance cases over the last century, properly concluding that a
defendant's creation of a public nuisance renders him liable for the
46
resulting damages regardless of current control of the nuisance.
For example, as early as 1910, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
recognized that a manufacturer of chemicals could be held liable
under public nuisance when their chemicals contaminated either
private or public waters in Rhode Island. 4 7 Although the chemical
manufacturer was not in control of the private or public waters it
contaminated, the court found the manufacturer liable for
creating a public nuisance. 48 Rhode Island's application of public

45. Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I. 1990)
(internal citations omitted).
46. Similarly, other courts have established public nuisance liability in
cases where a defendant created a nuisance on either public or private
property not controlled by the defendant. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 1222 (D. Mass. 1986) (groundwater contamination);
Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772,
775 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 822 (groundwater contamination);
Branch v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Lewis v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D. Mass. 1999); B&D Molded Products. v. Vitek
Research Corp., No. 970060362S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2363, at *1
(Conn. Super. Aug., 17 1998); N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection and Energy v.
Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Services, 821 F. Supp. 999, 1012-13 (D.N.J. 1993);
North Carolina ex rel. Howes v. W.R. Peele, 876 F. Supp. 733, 737 (E.D.N.C.
1995).
47. Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas. Co., 77 A. 145, 170 (R.I. 1910).
48. Id. See also Friends of the Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 633-34 (finding
defendants who contaminated the waters of Rhode Island liable under public
nuisance despite the fact that the defendants exercised no control over the
polluted waters); Pine v. Shell Oil Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21043, at *1415 (finding Shell Oil created a nuisance by releasing hydrocarbons into the
ground despite the fact that Shell Oil did not control the land it had polluted);
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nuisance liability to those who do not currently control the real
property upon which the nuisance is located is consistent with the
49
law across the country.
Second, public nuisance law simply does not grant blanket
immunity to product manufacturers. Rather, under Rhode Island
law, a public nuisance includes "behavior that unreasonably
interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of
the general community." 50 Further, public nuisance "[1liability is
Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1248 (R.I. 1982) (holding defendants created a
public nuisance by allowing chemical wastes to contaminate surrounding
property despite the fact that defendants did not control the property that
had become contaminated).
49. According to 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 116 (1999):

[als a general rule, one who creates a nuisance is liable for the
resulting damages, and ordinarily his liability continues as long as
the nuisance continues. Furthermore, liability for nuisance may be
imposed upon one who sets in motion the forces which eventually
cause the tortious act, and all who participate in the creation or
maintenance of a nuisance are liable for injuries suffered by others
as a result of such nuisance (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96 C 3664, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8551, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1997) ("under Illinois law, liability [for a
public nuisance] may be established by demonstrating that the defendant
was the creator of the nuisance"); North Carolina ex rel. Howes v. W.R. Peele,
Sr. Trust, 876 F. Supp. 733, 741 (E.D.N.C. 1995) ("The person who creates
the nuisance is liable and that liability continues as long as the nuisance
exists."); N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. & Energy v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt.
Services, 821 F. Supp. 999, 1012-13 (D.N.J. 1993) ("It is enough for a
nuisance claim to stand that the [defendants] allegedly contributed to the
creation of a situation which, it is alleged, unreasonably interfered with a
right common to the general public."); New York v. Fermenta ACS Corp., 608
N.Y.S.2d 980, 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) ("While generally nuisance actions are
brought against landowners, 'everyone who creates a nuisance or participates
in the creation or maintenance of a nuisance are liable... for the wrong and
injury done thereby.'" (internal citations omitted)); Selma Pressure Treating
Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1619-20 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (quoting Hardin v. Sin Claire, 115 Cal. 460, 463 (1896) ("any
person creating or assisting to create and maintain the nuisance was liable to
be sued for its abatement and for damages"); Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., 587 F. Supp. 144, 147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 762
F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985); Duncan v. Flagler, 132 P.2d 939, 940 (Okla. 1942)
("the general rule is stated that all those who participate in the creation ...

of a nuisance are liable to third persons for injuries suffered therefrom");
Shurpin v. Elmhurst, 148 Cal. App. 3d 94, 101 Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("the party
or parties who create or assist in [the creation of a nuisance] ... [are]

responsible for the ensuing damages"); Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Episcopal Cmty. Servs., 712 P.2d 914, 920 (Ariz. 1985).
50. Citizens for the Pres. of Waterman Lake, 420 A.2d at 59 (emphasis
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imposed... in those cases in which the harm or risk to one is
greater than he ought to be required to bear under the
circumstances." 51 No mention is made anywhere in Rhode Island
law that product manufacturers are immune from public nuisance
liability.52 As such, Defendants' arguments for immunity do not

added).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Case law from around the country reveals numerous instances in
which courts have found that manufacturers of hazardous products are liable
under nuisance law for injury caused by their products when the
manufacturers' conduct created that public nuisance. See Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A. v. T&N PLC, 905 F. Supp. 107, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that
the plaintiff could maintain an action for public nuisance against the
manufacturer of an asbestos fire-proofing spray); Page County Appliance
Ctr., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 171, 177 (Iowa 1984) (finding the
manufacturer of a computer system that emitted radiation materially
participated in the creation of the nuisance and could be held liable); New
York v. Fermenta ASC Corp., 616 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (finding the
manufacturer of a pesticide could be liable under public nuisance for
contamination of groundwater caused by the product) See Alaska v.Philip
Morris, Case No. 1JU-97-915CI, Transcript of Oral Argument at 5 (1st Jud.
Dist. Juneau Apr. 29, 1998) (Oct. 9, 1998) (the court deciding the State of
Alaska had stated a claim for public nuisance by alleging "defendants
targeted and addicted minors, denied that nicotine is addictive while
manipulating nicotine levels to promote addiction, and lied about the illeffects of tobacco while suppressing safer products."); Wisconsin v. Philip
Morris, Case No. 97-CV-328, Decision & Order at 22 (Branch 11 Mar. 17,
1998) (finding the tobacco defendants "interfered with the public's right to be
free of unwarranted injury and illness, and have directly caused the State to
incur substantial costs in order to lessen the negative effects of tobaccorelated health problems.... Accordingly, this [public nuisance] claim is
necessary... to provide compensation for economic injuries."); Oklahoma v.
R.J. Reynolds, No. CJ-96-1499, Transcript at 171 (Cleveland Co. July 7, 1998)
("to the extent that the jury finds wrongful acts such as targeting and
addicting minors, denying that nicotine is addictive, secretly manipulating
nicotine levels to promote addiction, misdirecting public opinion, misdirecting
advertising, lying about ill effects of tobacco, and suppressing the promotion
of safer products, to the extent the state can establish that and a jury finds
that those wrongful acts did occur, that can rise to the level of public
nuisance in Oklahoma."); Montana ex rel. Mazurek v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
CDV97-306, Memorandum & Order (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 22, 1998); Iowa
v. Philip Morris, Inc., Co. CL 71048, Ruling (Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1997); Puerto
Rico ex rel. Rossello v. Brown & Williamson, No. 97-1910JAF, Opinion and
Order (D.P.R. June 3, 1998); Oregon v. Philip Morris, No. 9706 04457,
Amended Order (Cir. Ct. July 6, 1998); Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, No.
96-148, Transcript (Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1997); New Mexico v. The Am. Tobacco
Co., No. SF 97-1235 (C), Decision (1st Jud. Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 1998); Mississippi
ex rel. Moore v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429, Judgment (Ch. Ct. Feb. 21,
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apply in the public nuisance realm.
Finally, the Defendants' attempts to have the public nuisance
count dismissed by claiming the State is seeking damages for
interference with private rights, as opposed to public rights, are
vanquished by prior precedent from Rhode Island courts. That
prior precedent established that the presence of Lead in homes in
the State interferes with public rights and, therefore, is actionable
as a public nuisance. In Pine v. Kalian,5 3 both the trial court and
the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the presence of lead
paint in a rental property was a public nuisance "constitut[ing] a
continuing, persistent hazard of lead poisoning to members of the
public who occupy such premises, especially to children of tender
years." 54 Implicit in this decision is the determination that lead

poisoning and its hazards are issues of concern to the public
health, safety and welfare, and therefore, are actionable under a
55
public nuisance claim.

1995).
53. In Pine v. Kalian, the Attorney General filed a complaint sounding in
public nuisance against a landlord seeking the abatement of lead-based paint
from his rental property. The trial court in that case found that "serious
health risks to young children from exposure to lead have been clearly
established by the record in [that] case" and that the home in question
"contain[s] enough lead so as to constitute a continuing, persistent hazard of
lead poisoning to members of the public who occupy such premises, especially
to children of tender years." No. 96-2673, 1998 WL 34090599, at *1 (R.I.
Super. Feb 2, 1998). Accordingly, the court concluded that "[t]he premises
are a public nuisance. This Court has general equitable power, as well as
statutory jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1997) § 10-1-1 et seq., to abate a
public nuisance upon the application of the Attorney General." Id. at *2
(emphasis added). In affirming the trial court's issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that "the persistence
of the continuing hazard of lead paint presents immediate and irreparable
harm to the public so long as that hazard remains unabated." Pine, 723 A.2d
at 805. This conclusion is consistent with almost a century of Rhode Island
precedent concerning the definition and scope of public nuisance law and is
dispositive of the public nuisance count in this action.
54. Kalian, 723 A.2d at 805.
55. In addition, courts from around the country have determined that a
nuisance can be both private and public and, when the aggregate of private
injuries becomes so large, the issue becomes one of public concern actionable
under public nuisance. See Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal
Cmty. Servs., 712 P.2d 914, 917 (Ariz. 1985) ("a nuisance may be
simultaneously public and private when a considerable number of people
suffer an interference with their use and enjoyment of land. The torts are not
mutually exclusive." (citation omitted)); Cline v. Franklin Pork, Inc., 361
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2. The State's Lead Pigment Suit and the Rhode Island Lead
PoisoningPreventionAct
The Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the Lead
Poisoning Prevention Act (hereinafter LPPA) in 1991 in response
to the staggering rates of childhood lead poisoning in our state.
The Legislature found that:
(1) Environmental exposures to even low levels of lead
increase a child's risks of developing permanent learning
disabilities, reduced concentration and attentiveness and
behavior problems, problems which may persist and
adversely affect the child's chances for success in school
and life.
(2) Childhood lead poisoning is caused by environmental
exposure to lead. The most significant sources of
environmental lead are lead based paint in older housing
and house dust and soil contaminated by this paint.
(3) Childhood lead poisoning is completely preventable.
(4) Rhode Island does not currently have a comprehensive
strategy in place for preventing childhood lead poisoning.
As a result, tens of thousands of Rhode Island's children
are poisoned by lead at levels believed to be harmful with
most of these poisoned children going undiagnosed and
untreated.
(5) Childhood lead poisoning is dangerous to the public
health, safety, and general welfare of the people and
necessitates excessive and disproportionate expenditure
of public funds for health care and special education,
causing a drain upon public revenue.
(6) The enactment and enforcement of this chapter is
N.W.2d 566 (Neb. 1985); New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409
N.Y.S.2d 40, 43 (Sup. Ct. 1978) ("Public also is the nuisance committed in
such a place and in such manner that the aggregation of private injuries
become so great and extensive as to constitute a public annoyAnce and
inconvenience, and a wrong against the community, which may be properly
the subject of a public prosecution."); City of Va. Beach v. Murphy, 389 S.E.2d
462, 463 (Va. 1990).
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essential to the public interest. It is intended that the
provisions of this chapter be liberally construed to
effectuate its purposes.
(7) The magnitude of the childhood lead poisoning in
Rhode Island's older homes and urban areas is a result of
approved use of lead based materials over an extended
period in public buildings and systems and private
housing that a comprehensive approach is necessary to
alleviate the cause, identify and treat the children,
rehabilitate the affected housing where young children
reside, and dispose of the hazardous material. Rhode
Island presently does not have the public or the private
resources to handle the total problem, requiring
56
prioritizing on a need basis.
Furthermore, "the express purpose of the LPPA is 'to protect
the public health and the public interest by establishing a
comprehensive program to reduce exposure to environmental lead
and thereby prevent childhood lead poisoning, the most severe
environmental health problem in Rhode Island.'

57

Finally, the

LPPA provides that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be
liberally construed and shall be held to be in addition to, and not
in substitution for or a limitation of, the provisions of any other
58

law."

In another effort to shield themselves from liability for the
public nuisance, the Defendants argued at numerous times during
the litigation that the existence of the LPPA and its governance of
lead poisoning prevention and abatement interferes with or
supersedes the Attorney General's common law public nuisance
claim. The trial court rejected this argument for several reasons. 59
Specifically, the trial court found:
[L]anguage [of the LPPA] mandated the law be liberally
interpreted so as to permit the LPPA to co-exist
(consistent with its terms) with common law equity power
56. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-24.6-2 (1986).
57. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830, at
*5 (R.I. Super. Apr. 2, 2001) (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-24.6-3).
58. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-24.6-25 (1986).
59. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2003 WL 1880120, at
*2 (R.I. Super. Mar. 20, 2003).
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as to public nuisances vested in the Attorney General
even prior to the adoption of our State Constitution. The
Court further notes that the provisions of LPPA clearly in
the first instance were intended by the General Assembly
to protect the health of children and that its provisions
almost exclusively deal with owners of dwellings,
dwelling units or premises and not in any way with
manufacturers of lead pigment used in paint and coatings
or, indeed, with manufacturers or vendors of paint or
paint products. It, of course, is the alleged manufacturers
60
of such pigment who, here, are the Defendants.
This holding is in concert with the great weight of authority
in Rhode Island, where courts have frequently determined that a
condition can be regulated by statute and also declared to be a
61
common law public nuisance.
3. Product IdentificationIs Not Required to Bring a Public
Nuisance Claim
Defendants also sought to have the public nuisance claim
dismissed wholesale, arguing that the public nuisance law
requires that, as a matter of law, the State prove the existence of
each Defendant's lead pigment in particular homes and buildings
throughout the State of Rhode Island. Stated differently, the
question was whether the conduct of these Defendants in
manufacturing, marketing and promoting Lead, both individually
and collectively, was sufficient to establish liability for creating a

60. Id. at *3.See also Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2001 WL 345830, at *5 ("the
express purpose of the LPPA is 'to protect the public health and the public
interest by establishing a comprehensive program to reduce exposure to
environmental lead and thereby prevent childhood lead poisoning, the most
severe environmental health problem in Rhode Island.' G.L. 1956 § 23-24.6.3.
Accordingly, the absence of express authorization in the statute does not
constitute a separation of powers bar which absolutely precludes the
Attorney General from bringing this type of action.").
61. See State v. Carpionato, 605 A.2d 498, 498 (R.I. 1992) (sign
maintenance statute); Bierman v. Shookster, 590 A. d 402, 403 (R.I. 1991)
(traffic control signal maintenance statute); Citizens for Pres. of Waterman
Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 56 (R.I. 1980) (Fresh Water Wetlands Act);
Berberian v. Avery, 205 A.2d 579 (R.I. 1964) (Mosquito Abatement Act); Pine
v. Kalian, No. 96-2673, 1998 WL 34090599, at *3 (R.I. Super. Feb. 2, 1998),
affd, 723 A.2d 804 (R.I. 1998).
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public nuisance in the State of Rhode Island or whether lack of
product identification was fatal to the case.
Defendants urged the trial court to incorporate the
requirements and holding of Gorman v. Abbott Laboratories.62 In
that case, the Supreme Court considered personal injury cases
against multiple drug manufacturers. 63 The plaintiff was unable
to identify the manufacturer of the particular drug she ingested,
and therefore relied on the market-share theory of liability to
escape traditional product identification requirements in product
liability suits. 64 The Gorman court rejected the market-share

doctrine 65 and instead required the identification of a specific
defendant in order to establish liability. 66 The lead manufacturers
argued that the Gorman court's product manufacturer
identification requirement should be applied to Rhode Island's
public nuisance claim, requiring the State to identify with
particularity the manufacturer of the lead pigment in each house
67
in Rhode Island.
62. 599 A.2d 1364 (R.I. 1991).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The market share doctrine was recognized by California in Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories,607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), in response to the causation
problems that women injured by their mothers' ingestion of the drug DES
during pregnancy were having in seeking a remedy against the
manufacturers of that drug. These women could not identify the specific
manufacturer of the DES that their mothers had taken because the DES pills
from one manufacturer were identical to those of another manufacturer. Id.
at 936. Through the market share doctrine, the California court relaxed the
requirement that an injured party must prove which manufacturer produced
the actual DES pill their mother took by allowing her to bring into the
litigation the manufacturers who represented the market for DES at the time
her mother may have ingested DES. Id. at 937. Once those manufacturers
were in suit, the burden shifted to them to prove that they did not
manufacture the product that caused the harm. Id. If liability were found,
then damages against that manufacturer would be apportioned in accordance
with its share of the market. Id.
66. Gorman, 599 A.2d at 1364.
67. The market share defense has been effective in personal injury suits
against the lead industry. Because it is impossible for a lead poisoned child
to identify the particular manufacturer of the lead pigment he or she
ingested, numerous courts have rejected their personal injury claims and left
lead poisoned children with no redress against the lead manufacturers. See
supra, note 66. However, in July 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed the tide of dismissals, adopted a modified market share theory of
liability called risk-contribution, which allows individual lead poisoned
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The trial court ultimately rejected the Defendants' argument,
focusing its analysis on the distinctions between products liability
law and public nuisance law. First, the court had long recognized
that the condition alleged to be a public nuisance is the collective
presence of lead pigment in paints throughout Rhode Island. As
the court stated:
[t]he issue... was not as to if such pigment in any
particular building or group of buildings (however
numerous) constituted a public nuisance, but rather
whether the cumulative effect of all such pigment in such
68
properties constitutes a single public nuisance.
Indeed, it ruled that "property specific evidence is irrelevant
in connection with the issues of whether the cumulative effect of
such pigment in all such buildings, (that is to say buildings
containing lead pigment in paint or coating), was a public
nuisance ."..69
Relying on two of its previous decisions in this litigation, 70 the
trial court then concluded that the product identification
requirements enunciated in Gorman were inapplicable to the
State's public nuisance claim. As the court stated, "[first, and of
some significance the present case is not a products liability
case . . ."71 It then explained:
During the course of argument, defendants seemed to
read into Gorman and the other cases they cited, a
requirement for product identification in this public
nuisance case, a requirement that this Court does not
find. This is not a case where it is alleged that one
defendant out of a number of defendants (but plaintiff
cannot tell which) made a product causing injury to a
single individual but rather it is a case where it is
children to sue the Lead defendants absent proof of the particular
manufacturer of lead pigment that he ingested. See Thomas ex. rel.
Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (2005).
68. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2004 WL 2813747, at
*1 (R.I. Super. Nov. 9, 2004).
69. Id. at *2.
70. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2001 WL 345830, at *7 (R.I.
Super. Apr. 2, 2001); Lead IndustriesAss'n, 2004 WL 2813747, at *1.
71. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 2005 WL 1331196 at *2 (June 3,
2005).
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claimed that each of the defendants through their own
separate actions or conduct was a substantial cause of the
massive public nuisance and harms and/or injuries
resulting therefrom. What the Court does find is that if
what plaintiff contends for, that is to say that each
defendant's conduct or activities were a proximate cause
of the public nuisance alleged, the cumulative effect of
lead pigment in buildings throughout the state
(sometimes stated as the collective presence of lead
pigment in buildings throughout the state of Rhode
Island), and of injury resulting therefrom then indeed
liability of the defendants may be found. In order to prove
that causation, defendants must establish that each
defendant's conduct was a substantial cause of the public
nuisance and that the public nuisance was a substantial
factor in causing injury to the public which injury is
72
subject of this action.
Having rejected Defendants' arguments, the court recognized
the clear distinction between products liability law and public
nuisance law. It is noteworthy that concepts from each are not
easily interchangeable, and that strict adherence to the law of
public nuisance requires an analysis distinct from product liability
73
concepts.
4. Legality of Product and Actions of Others
In addition, the Defendants urged both the trial court and the
jury to reject the public nuisance claim for two reasons: (1) Lead
pigment was a legal product at the time it was applied to the walls
of Rhode Island homes and buildings; and (2) the subsequent
actions of homeowners and landlords served to immunize the
Defendants from public nuisance liability. These arguments failed
at the motion to dismiss stage, summary judgment stage and
failed to convince the jury at trial.
First, established law holds that it is irrelevant to a nuisance
cause of action that the conduct complained of may be legal or
72. Id.
73. Hearing Transcript at 23, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, D.A.
No. 99-5226 (Oct. 5, 2005) (granting plaintiffs motion to strike Defendants'
product liability affirmative defenses to the State's complaint)
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even appropriate and necessary in a certain circumstance. In the
words of the United States Supreme Court, "[n]uisance may be
merely a right thing in a wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard."74 Other courts have subsequently
agreed, holding that the fact that a defendant's conduct is
75
otherwise lawful does not preclude liability for public nuisance.
Similarly, the subsequent actions of anyone - even
homeowners
and landlords do not immunize
Lead
manufacturers from liability.
Instead, a jury must consider
whether those actions are superseding, intervening causes of the
harm
caused
by
the
presence
of Lead.
Legally,
superseding/intervening cause is often utilized by negligent
parties to insulate them from liability for those negligent acts.
The burden of proving the defense is on the defendant, who must
demonstrate that the "intervening" actor: (1) was negligent, (2) his
negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm and (3)
his negligence was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
76
defendant's original negligence.
The third element of foreseeability is the lynchpin of the
superseding/intervening cause defense. Where, as here, a party
seeks to sever the proximate cause chain between its conduct and
the resulting injury, that party must demonstrate that the
intervening act was not foreseeable and has rendered its original
acts totally inoperable:
[A]n intervening act will not insulate a defendant from
liability if his negligence was a concurring proximate
cause which had not been rendered remote by reason of
the secondary cause which intervened. The test for
remoteness is whether the intervening act could
reasonably have been foreseen as a natural and probable

74. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
75. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y.
2003); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 394 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn.
1974); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004);
City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind.
2003); County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
76. See Pantalone v. Advanced Energy Delivery Sys., Inc., 694 A.2d 1213,
1215 (R.I. 1997).
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result of the original act of negligence of the defendant. If
it could have been so foreseen, the intervening negligence
is not so remote as to prevent the original act from being
considered at law as merely a concurring cause of the
injury. 77

Furthermore, "[i]t is well settled that for an independent
intervening cause to replace a defendant's original negligence as
the proximate cause of an accident, the original negligent conduct
78
must have become totally inoperative as a cause of the injury."
On the other hand, an unforeseeable intervening cause will break
the causal chain and allows the original wrongdoer to escape
liability. In such cases, "the intervening.. .act becomes the sole
79
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries."
Courts
considering
the
affirmative
defense
of
superseding/intervening cause in the context of a public nuisance
claim have concluded:
Intervening actions between a defendant and the harm
suffered by the public, even multiple or criminal actions
taken by third parties or occurring naturally, do not
break the chain of causation if a defendant could have
expected their nature and effect ....

[T]he causal chain is

not broken even where it is the third party that is the
most immediate causal event of the injury to the
80

public."

77. Roberts v. Kettelle, 356 A.2d 207, 215 (R.I. 1976). See also Aldcroft v.
Fid. & Cas. Co., 259 A.2d 408 (1969); Almeida v. Town of N. Providence, 468
A.2d 915, 917 (R.I. 1983) (stating that if the intervening cause was
foreseeable to the original wrongdoer, then the "causal connection remains
unbroken" and liability remains with the original wrongdoer); Mahogany v.
Ward, 17 A. 860, 861 (R.I. 1889) ("[Ihf the intervening act is such as might
reasonably have been anticipated as the natural or probable result of the
original negligence, the original negligence will, notwithstanding such
intervening act, be regarded as the proximate cause of the injury, and will
render the person guilty of it chargeable."); Walsh v. Israel Couture Post, No.
2274 V.F.W. of the U.S., 542 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1988) ("[An intervening
act ...

will not insulate an original tortfeasor if it appears that such

intervening act is a natural and probable consequence of the initial
tortfeasor's act.").
78. Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, Inc., 502 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I.
1986) (citingRoberts, 356 A.2d 207) (emphasis added).
79. Almeida, 468 A.2d at 917.
80. N.A.A.C.P., 271 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
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Instead, liability for nuisance will lie when the acts or
omissions of the Defendants "remain[] the dominant and relevant
fact[s] without which the public nuisance would not have resulted
where and under the circumstances it did," irrespective of
intervening actions by third parties.8 '
In conformity with this law, the trial court instructed the
jury:
[iin determining whether the acts of others constitute an
intervening superseding cause, you must consider
whether the conduct of the defendants, or any of them,
created or increased a foreseeable risk of harm through
the intervention of such others' acts. If defendants'
conduct created or increased the foreseeable harm, risk of
harm, through the intervention of the subsequent actor,
then the intervening acts cannot be said to be an
intervening superseding cause and defendants will not
82
have proved their assertion.
The court also instructed the jury:
The act or failure to act by a defendant need not be
intentional or negligent to impose liability for creating a
public nuisance. Rather, the fact that the conduct which
caused the public nuisance otherwise is lawful or has not
been made unlawful does not preclude liability where
that conduct nevertheless results in the public nuisance.8 3
Jurors reported that these two issues - legality of the product
and the conduct of others - were factors in their decision. In fact,
for some, Defendants' arguments that the product was legal and
that the faults lie with landlords and homeowners had social and

81. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker, 353 A.2d 471, 479 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1976), affd 371 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1977). See also United States v. Hooker
Chemicals and Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 968 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)
(rejected argument that causal connection between defendant's conduct and
the nuisance "was broken by independent acts of other parties which
constituted superseding causes" when defendant's conduct "remains the
dominant and relevant fact without which the public nuisance would not
have resulted where and under the circumstances it did."').
82. Official Trial Transcript at 130-31, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
No. 99-5226 (Feb. 13, 2006).
83. Id. at 129.
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philosophical appeal.8 4 But the justice system prevailed, and
jurors reported that they were able to put aside their philosophical
or political biases and apply the law to the facts.8 5 When applying
the law regarding superseding/intervening cause, the jurors
ultimately "agreed that regardless of what the landlords did, the
harm began with the companies distributing toxic paints." 6 On
the issue of the legality of the product, jurors also reported that
they strictly adhered to the law as enunciated by the trial court.
One juror who was affected by the argument reported:
after rereading the judge's instructions, it became clear to
him that the paint - even if applied decades ago - had

caused harm and that it had interfered with the rights of
children to be safe in their own homes. The fact that the
pigment makers had not broken any laws did not
preclude a finding of liability, according to the judge, nor
87
did the contributions of lousy landlords to the problem.
Despite all of these challenges to the modern application of
public nuisance law to the situation created and maintained by
the Defendants in Rhode Island because of their manufacture,
sale, promotion and marketing of lead, the State successfully
presented its case to the jury.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JURY'S VERDICT FOR THE STATE'S CLAIM

84. See Krouse, supra note 15, at Al (noting that one of the jurors
originally "wanted to let the paint-company defendants off the hook. He
wanted to blame slumlords for the dangers of lead paint in Rhode Island
homes, not the firms that prosecutors claim made the pigment decades ago.");
Lord, supra note 1, at 1 (reporting that one juror said that "'[s]ome of us
thought a big part of the problem was poor maintenance'" and another said
that "'[mlost of use wanted to blame the landlords."').
85. One law professor who commented on the trial to the Cleveland
Plain-Dealer questioned "how lead paint can be ruled a public nuisance
without taking into account the lack of home maintenance that contributes to
the problem." Krouse, supra note 15, at Al. However, the record reveals that
in this case, the lack of maintenance defense was presented to the jury,
covered in the jury instructions and ultimately rejected by the jury because it
did not satisfy the legal requirements of a superseding, intervening cause
affirmative defense. Thus, any such criticism of the verdict is without
foundation in facts of this case and is best attributed to the spin generated by
the defendants after the verdict.
86. Lord, supra note 1, at B4.
87. Peter Krouse, Verdict Raises Risk for Paint Companies, THE
CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER, Apr. 2, 2006 at Al.
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Armed with this public nuisance law, the jury sifted through
the testimony of twelve witnesses and numerous documents
admitted into evidence over eight days. Included among the
witnesses were four medical/scientific experts,88 three State public
health experts or officials,8 9 three historians, 90 and two experts in

88. The four medical/scientific experts were Dr. Philip Landrigan, Ms.
June Tourangeau, Dr. Michael Shannon, and Dr. James Girard.
Dr. Philip Landrigan received his M.D. from Harvard University in 1967.
Dr. Landrigan has been at the forefront of childhood lead poisoning research
and prevention efforts for over thirty years. During this time he has worked
at or consulted with the United States Public Health Service, the Centers for
Disease Control and the Environmental Protection Agency on issues related
to childhood lead poisoning. Dr. Landrigan is board certified in Pediatrics,
Preventative and Occupational & Environmental Medicine and is a member
of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association
and the American Public Health Association. Dr. Landrigan has conducted
extensive research and written numerous peer reviewed articles on the
subject of childhood lead poisoning.
Ms. June Tourangeau is a Licensed Practical Nurse who has served lead
poisoned children in Rhode Island since 1978. Tourangeau is also a Licensed
Lead Inspector and Certified Lead Technician. Tourangeau developed the
model childhood lead poisoning case management system for the State of
Rhode Island and has investigated hundreds of homes and hundreds of lead
poisoning cases over the past decade.
Dr. Michael Shannon holds an M.D. from Duke University, an M.P.H. from
the University of North Carolina and is board certified in pediatrics,
emergency medicine, and medical toxicology. Dr. Shannon currently serves
as Chief of Emergency Medicine at Boston Children's Hospital and as Chair
of the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Environmental Health.
During his illustrious career, Dr. Shannon has conducted extensive research
and authored many articles on childhood lead poisoning, and has personally
treated over 5,500 lead poisoned children.
Dr. James Girard received his Ph.D. in Chemistry from Penn State
University in 1971. Dr. Girard is a Professor of Chemistry and the Chairman
of the Chemistry Department at American University in Washington, D.C.,
where he instructs students on government approved methods for analyzing
materials in the environment including lead in paint.
89. The three public health officials were Dr. Patricia Nolan, Mr. Dean
Albro, and the Honorable David Cicilline.
Dr. Patricia Nolan holds an M.S. in Public Health, an M.D. from Magill
University and is board certified in Public Health. A public health servant
for over thirty years, Dr. Nolan served as the Director of the Department of
Health for the State of Rhode Island from 1995-2005. During her time as
Director, the Department of Health spearheaded a statewide cooperative
effort that resulted in a significant reduction in both the incidence and
prevalence of childhood lead poisoning in Rhode Island.
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Mr. Dean Albro received a B.S. in Resource Development from the
University of Rhode Island in 1977. Since 1996, Mr. Albro has served as
Chief of the Office of Compliance and Inspection for the Rhode Island
Department of Environmental Management where among his primary
responsibilities, Mr. Albro is responsible for enforcing DEM Air Regulation
24, the rules and regulations related to exterior lead-based paint removal in
Rhode Island.
Mayor David Cicilline holds a B.S. in Political Science and a J.D. from
Georgetown University Law Center. Since 2002, Mayor Cicilline has served
as Mayor of the City of Providence and has made lead poisoning prevention a
priority of his administration. In so doing, Mayor Cicilline directed the
preparation of the Consolidated Plan for the City of Providence 2005-2010
which addresses elimination of childhood lead poisoning within the City of
Providence.
90. The three historians were Dr. Gerald Markowitz, Dr. David Rosner,
and Dr. Michael Kosnett.
Dr. Gerald Markowitz received his Doctorate in History from the University
of Wisconsin in 1971. He currently serves as an Adjunct Professor of
Sociomedical Sciences at Columbia University and as a Distinguished
Professor of History at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Dr. Markowitz,
in conjunction with Dr. David Rosner, has dedicated himself to the study of
the history of the conduct of the members of the lead pigment industry,
involving the systematic review of hundreds of thousands of pages of
historical, scientific and corporate documents from numerous sources. As a
result, Dr. Markowitz has published numerous articles and books on lead
poisoning, including the award winning book "Deceit & Denial - The Deadly
Politics of Industrial Pollution."
Dr. Markowitz has given numerous
presentations on the conduct of the members of the lead pigment industry
before such esteemed organizations as the American Public Health
Association and the Wisconsin State Department of Health.
Dr. David Rosner holds a Ph.D. in the History of Science from Harvard
University and an M.S. in Public Health from the University of
Massachusetts. Dr. Rosner currently serves as a Professor of History and
Public Health of Sociomedical Sciences at Columbia University, and as an
Adjunct Professor of Community Medicine and as the Director for the Center
for the History of Ethics in Public Health at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine.
Together with Dr. Gerald Markowitz, Dr. Rosner has dedicated himself to the
study of the conduct of the members of the lead pigment industry, the results
of which he has presented before numerous organizations including Yale
University, Columbia University, NYU, Johns Hopkins, Centers for Disease
Control and the National Institute of Public Health. Dr. Rosner has authored
dozens of articles and books, including his work as co-author of the awardwinning book "Deceit & Denial - The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution."
Dr. Michael Kosnett holds an M.D. from the University of California, San
Francisco, an M.S. in Public Health and Toxicology from Berkeley and a B.S.
from Yale University. Dr. Kosnett is board certified in Medical Toxicology,
Preventative and Occupational & Environmental Medicine and is a Professor
at the University of Colorado, School of Medicine. Dr. Kosnett has over
twenty years experience treating hundreds of lead poisoned children.
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identifying and remediating lead paint and lead paint hazards. 91
Each of these witnesses was called by the State; the Defendants
surprisingly did not call a single witness to counter the testimony
of the State's experts. 92 These witnesses presented the following
statistical evidence from 2004: (1) 172 children were significantly
94
lead poisoned, 93 (2) 1,167 children had elevated blood lead levels
and (3) every city and town in Rhode Island, with the exception of
Gloucester, had a lead poisoned child that year. 95 The witnesses
pointed out that, because of the larger number of older houses
throughout the state, the risk of lead poisoning occurring
96
statewide is significant.

91. The two lead paint experts were Mr. Frank King and Ms. Bonnie
Cassani.
Frank King has been a Registered Rhode Island General Contractor
specializing in lead hazard abatement for over twenty years. In 1993, Mr.
King was among the first contractors in the State of Rhode Island to become
a Licensed Lead Hazard Reduction Contractor. Since 1993, as President and
Owner of KRA, Inc., Mr. King has performed lead hazard reduction services
on over 1,500 properties within the State of Rhode Island.
Ms. Cassani is the sole proprietor of Northeast Lead Management, a
company organized to conduct lead-based paint inspections and based in
Rhode Island. In 1993, Ms. Cassani became the first Master Environmental
Lead Inspector in Rhode Island, and today, is one of only two Master
Environmental Lead Inspectors in Rhode Island. During her career, Ms.
Cassani has inspected thousands of homes, schools, daycare centers and
other buildings in Rhode Island for lead hazards.
92. The jurors' response to the defendants' decision to present no
witnesses at trial was reported in newspapers, many of which considered the
surprising litigation tactic to be a factor in the Lead industry's defeat.
According to the New York Times, one factor in the loss may have been "the
courtroom-strategy battles among the defense lawyers, and their hubris from
never having lost a lawsuit before." Julie Creswell, The Nuisance That May
Cost Billions, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, Apr. 2, 2006 at Sec. 3. Furthermore,
"[t]hree of the six jurors interviewed for this article... said they had been
surprised and disappointed that the defense did not offer any witnesses to
rebut the State's central allegation: That simply by having been in the
business of making lead-based paint, companies contributed to what is now a
pervasive public nuisance. 'They could have brought their own witnesses up
there,' the jury's foreman, Gerald Lenau, said. 'The fact is, the person you
hear last does leave a lasting impression, but maybe they couldn't dispute
anything.'"). Id.
93. Official Morning Trial Transcript at 67-70, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 14, 2005).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 70-72.
96. Id. at 72.
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The statistics also have an economic impact, not only because
of the numbers of kids poisoned and the irreversible damage
suffered by those children,9 7 but also because of the reduction in
earning capacity such poisoning causes. 98 In addition, childhood
lead poisoning causes burdens on society because taxpayer dollars
are used to defray medical costs, relocation costs, and special
education costs for lead poisoned children. 99 This economic impact
is especially acute because even very low levels of lead can
negatively influence a child's nervous system development and
educational and intellectual outcomes. 00
On the issue of liability, the State presented evidence to the
jury on each defendant's acts and omissions that substantially
contributed to the public nuisance in Rhode Island. It was based
on these facts that the jury applied the law on liability for a public
nuisance, finding that Defendants NL Industries, Inc.,
Millennium Holdings, LLC and The Sherwin-Williams Company
were liable for the nuisance. 101 Key evidence and allegations
against NL Industries, Inc. included:
"

Manufactured Lead from 1891 until 1975;102

"

Promoted Lead in paint as safe even though it knew
10 3
that pure white lead paint in fact was not safe;
Failed to recommend that homeowners be educated
10 4
about the toxicity of Lead in paint;
Fought regulations to include warnings or labels on its
products that contained Lead; 10 5
Sold and promoted Lead in Rhode Island. 106

*
"
"

97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 20.
99. Id. at 21-22.
100. Id. at 49.
101. The jury did not find that Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company was
liable for the nuisance because of their ten year involvement in the industry.
See Lord, supra note 1, at B1.
102. Official Afternoon Trial Transcript at 45, Rhode Island v. At.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 16, 2005).
103. Unofficial Trial Transcript at 29-30, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield
Co., No. 99-5226 (Jan. 13, 2006).
104. Id. at 30
105. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 8-11, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 15, 2005).
106. Official Trial Transcript at 77, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., No.
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Key evidence against The Sherwin-Williams Company was:
7
" Manufactured Lead from 1904 until 1971;1o
"
Made no effort to keep Lead pigment from being used
08
on buildings in Rhode Island;
* Sold and promoted in Rhode Island when it had actual
knowledge concerning childhood lead poisoning; 0 9
* Continued to sell Lead for use in paint knowing it
could poison kids.110

Key evidence against Millennium Holdings, LLC (predecessor
Glidden) included:
" Manufactured Lead from 1924 to 1958;11
" Promoted Lead in paint as safe despite knowledge of
11 2
the hazards;
* Consistently marketed its non-leaded paints as safe
3
alternatives to Lead paints;"
" Used advertisements that did not contain warnings of
11 4
Lead paint hazards;
* Sold and promoted Lead products in Rhode Island.;" 5
* Had actual knowledge of childhood lead poisoning
from Lead pigment at the time it manufactured such
116
pigment.

99-5226 (Jan. 13, 2006).
107. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 45-46, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 16, 2005).
108. Official Morning Trial Transcript at 65, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield
Co., No. 99-5226 (Jan. 20, 2006).
109. Official Trial Transcript at 77-78, Rhode Island v. At. Richfield Co.,
No. 99-5226 (Jan. 13, 2006).
110. Unofficial Morning Trial Transcript at 46, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 12, 2005).
111. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 140-141, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Jan. 20, 2006).
112. Official Trial Transcript at 31, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., No.
99-5226 (Jan. 13, 2006).
113.Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 134-36, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Jan. 20, 2006).
114. Official Trial Transcript at 22, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., No.
99-5226 (Jan. 13, 2006).
115. Official Trial Transcript at 77, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield Co., No.
99-5226 (Jan. 13, 2006).
116. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 47, Rhode Island v. Atl.
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Key evidence against Atlantic Richfield (predecessor International
Smelting and Refining Company) included:
*
*

*

Manufactured Lead from 1936 until 1946; 117
Never warned parents of the source of the poison for
childhood lead poisoning in the 1920s, 30s, 40s, 50s,
118
60s and beyond;
Fought regulations to include warning labels on its
harmful products.119

The witnesses also provided evidence against all the
defendants that implicated the industry as a whole for
contributing to this public nuisance. First, adequate alternatives
to lead pigments existed prior to 1978.120 Second, each defendant
was responsible for supplying Lead to thousands of paint
makers. 121 Third, these Defendants' total market share was
significant: ranging from 50 to 75% for dry white lead and 70 to
80% for white lead-in-oil. 122 Finally, the Defendants' trade
association, the Lead Industries Association (hereinafter "LIA"),
regularly sent medical articles on childhood lead poisoning to its
members while all defendants were members. 123 The LIA acted as
the Defendants' pseudo-lobbyist by monitoring legislation on
behalf of all its members and aggressively taking steps to void any
legislation that would restrict lead pigment use.124
The reasons reported in the press for the jury's verdict were

Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 12, 2005).
117. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 44, Rhode Island v. At.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 16, 2005).
118. Official Morning Trial Transcript at 60-61, Rhode Island v. At.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 15, 2005).
119. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 27-30, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 12, 2005).
120. Official Morning Trial Transcript at 31, Rhode Island v. Atl. Richfield
Co., No. 99-5226 (Nov. 7, 2005).
121. Official Morning Trial Transcript at 25-26, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Jan. 12, 2006).
122. Id. at 25.
123. Unofficial Afternoon Trial Transcript at 34-35, Rhode Island v. Atl.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 12, 2005).
124. Unofficial Morning Trial Transcript at 13-17, Rhode Island v. Atd.
Richfield Co., No. 99-5226 (Dec. 12, 2005).
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consistent with the law as laid out in the trial court's jury
instructions. First, the jury determined that the presence of Lead
pigment in paints throughout Rhode Island was a public nuisance.
One juror likened the effects of lead to a "'ripple effect' of
harm... [it wasn't just the poisoned children who suffered but
also their parents and the agencies that had to spend money on
the problem." 125 Another reported that "it became clear to him
that the paint - even if applied decades ago - had caused harm

and that it had interfered with the right of children to be safe in
126
their own homes."

The jury next decided that three of the four defendants named
in the lawsuit were liable for the public nuisance. As one juror
stated, "'The paint on the walls in Rhode Island didn't magically
27
That same juror also
appear. If they didn't do it, who did?""1
commented, "[t]he state said the companies manufactured and
sold 80 percent of the paint sold in the country. It was up to the
paint companies to say no, but they didn't furnish us with that.
All they had to say was no, but they did not because I don't think
'
they could."'

2

The final question the jury had to consider was whether the
liable defendants were required to abate the nuisance. 129 That
decision, reported the jury foreman, was made quickly after the
findings of public nuisance and liability."30 But although that
determination was made quickly, the ramifications of the
125. Krouse, supra note 15, at Al.
126. Id.
127. Creswell, supra note 16.
128. Id.
129. Since the outset of this case, the State has been clear that it was
seeking as part of its remedy for the public nuisance, the equitable remedy of
abatement. In its Complaint, the State sought relief in the form of an order
and judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally for "funding of a
public education campaign relating to the continuing dangers posed by Lead,
and for funding of lead-poisoning detection and preventative screening
programs in the State; [][j]udgment ordering the Defendants to detect and
abate Lead in all residences, schools, hospitals, and public and private
buildings within the State accessible to children; U [ain order awarding the
State such other extraordinary, declaratory and/or injunctive relief as
permitted by law or equity as necessary to assure that the State has an
[flor such other and further relief as the Court deems
effective remedy; and []
equitable, just, and proper." Complaint at 24, Oct. 29, 1999; Second
Amended Complaint at 25-26, Mar. 7, 2002.
130. Lord, supra note 1, at B4.

638 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:603
abatement decision are far-reaching.
First, in order to implement the jury's order of abatement, the
trial judge has to determine the manner in which abatement
should take place. Prior to the trial, the court determined that:
[T]he question of whether defendants or any of them shall
be required to abate or to otherwise provide nonmonetary relief as prayed by plaintiff shall be determined
by the jury. In the event that such relief is ordered by the
jury, this Court will conduct appropriate hearings, if
necessary, from time to time and fashion such orders as
under the circumstances might be appropriate in order to
implement any judgment of abatement rendered by the
jury.

13 1

The singular question still pending before the trial court is
the manner in which the defendants must be required to abate the
public nuisance found by the jury. At this time, the State has
requested that the trial court appoint a Special Master pursuant
to Rule 53 of the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure 132 who is
charged with designing an abatement plan that is consistent with
the evidence in this case and the public health needs. Specifically,
the State requests that the court: (1) appoint a Special Master
with specialized knowledge in the public health issues of lead
abatement and lead poisoning prevention, (2) ask that the Special

131.

Hearing Transcript at 7-10, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No.

99-5226 (Oct. 17, 2005). In reaching this decision, the trial court relied on
Hudson v. Caryl, a matter heard "in the days of yore," for the principle that
"'[tihe action when brought for the double object of removing the nuisance
and recovering the damages occasioned by it was always tried by jury. The
ancient remedy was by a size of nuisance demanding the sheriff to summon a
jury and view the premises. And if the jury found for the plaintiff, he was
entitled to judgment of two things. First, to have the nuisance abated; and
second, to recover damages.'" Id., citing Hudson v. Caryl, 44 N.Y. 553, 555
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1871). This Court further found that, "[t]he plaintiff here, in
view of the Court, has pleaded a case, and the discovery that the Court has
had an opportunity to review, indicates that if an alleged nuisance is found,
such nuisance in fact and in law would be abatable." Id.
132. Under Rule 53(a), "[t]he court may appoint a special master in any
appropriate action which is pending therein. As used in these rules, the word
"master" includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner and any other individual
or entity possessing such special expertise sufficient to serve the purpose or
purposes for which a master may be appointed under this rule." R.I. R. Civ.
P. 53(a).
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Master consider and answer specific questions that would be
relevant to assist the Court in determining the manner in which
the abatement will be carried out, (3) authorize the Special Master
to solicit factual information and professional opinions on the
manner, method, timing, cost and sequencing of the abatement of
this nuisance, and (4) authorize the parties to review and
comment on the Special Master's answers to the questions framed
133
by the Court.
Significant legal precedent exists for the appointment of a
special master to devise and oversee a remedial program. 3 4 For
example, special masters have been appointed in similar cases to
supervise the affirmative abatement of a nuisance. 135 This use of
a special master to assist in the abatement of a public nuisance is
also in accord with well-established precedent. For example,

133. See Plaintiff's Position Paper Concerning Hiring of a Special Master
To Assist in the Implementation of the Jury Verdict Ordering Abatement at 2
(Mar. 31, 2006).
134. See Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters, in Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 590 (1994) ("Expert masters
appointed after a finding of liability in environmental and institutional
reform litigation often advise the court by making recommendations for
detailed remedial orders or amendments to such orders in periodic reports
based on their own expertise.")
135. See State v. Patrick, 1990 WL 83402, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
20, 1990) (recognizing the power of a court sitting in equity to "be creative in
solving this problem [of abatement]" and that "a special master could be
appointed to monitor the [abatement]."); Gwinnett County v. Vaccaro, 376
S.E.2d 680, 682 (Ga. 1989) (finding, in a public nuisance action, "no error in
either the trial judge's appointment at county expense of a monitor to
supervise the necessary cleanup efforts at the Yellow River plant or in the
order of other measures which require expenditures."); Custred v. Jefferson
County, 360 So.2d 285, 288 (Ala. 1978) (wherein trial court interrupted trial
to appoint an independent special master to study and research the condition
of water in stream and lake alleged to be a public nuisance and to render a
report thereon).
In addition, there are numerous examples of public nuisance cases in which
special masters were employed for other purposes. See, e.g., New Jersey v.
City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 473 (1931) (recognizing a court's authority to
appoint a special master to receive evidence and render a report in public
nuisance case); N.A.A.C.P. v. Acusport Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 59, 59
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (appointing special master in public nuisance suit to resolve
discovery dispute); Charleston Comm. for Safe Water v. Commissioners of
Pub. Works, 331 S.E.2d 371, 371 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (using special master to
receive evidence in a public nuisance case); Mercer v. Keynton, 163 So. 411,
413 (Fla. 1935) (same).
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special masters have been employed in school desegregation cases
to help fashion an appropriate remedy and to oversee the
implementation of that remedy:
[I]t is a fact that public law litigation often places a trial
judge in a position where his role is necessarily somewhat
different from that performed in more traditional cases.
This is especially true in the remedial phase of a school
desegregation or institutional reform case. School and
institutional financing and administration are subjects
with which few judges have more than a passing
familiarity. Yet, when litigation exposes constitutional
violations in public institutions a court of equity must
take steps to eliminate them. In accomplishing this
result trial courts frequently issue orders which require
fundamental changes in the administrative and financial
structures of the institutions involved. In order to
accomplish these ends with fairness to all concerned a
judge in equity has inherent power to appoint persons
from outside the court system for assistance. 136
Finally, in addition to the clear authority imparted to the trial
court by Rule 53, a court also has the ability to appoint a Special
Master pursuant to its inherent equitable powers. Specifically,
abatement of a public nuisance requires the Court to utilize its
inherently flexible powers to fashion an appropriate remedy. The
"essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power... to mould
each

decree

to

the

necessities

of the

particular

case." 137

136. Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 743 (6th Cir. 1979).
See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291,
1313 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vac. on other grounds, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.), on
remand, 318 F. Supp. 786 (1970), affd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (the district court
appointing a special master who was an expert 'consultant' in educational
administration "to prepare immediately plans and recommendations to the
court for desegregation of the schools."); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn,
383 F. Supp. 699, 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (court noting that "[miasters to
determine remedies after liability has been determined by the court... have
been particularly useful.").
137. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). See also Texaco Puerto
Rico, Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 874 (1st Cir. 1995) ("This
emphasis on the particulars of each individual case is consistent with the
central feature of equity jurisdiction: 'the ability to assess all relevant facts
and circumstances and tailor appropriate relief on a case by case basis.'"
(quoting Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 321 (1st Cir.
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Furthermore, the Court's equitable powers are even broader and
more flexible when considering equitable issues implicating the
public interest. In Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,138 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that "since the public interest is
involved in a proceeding of this nature, those equitable powers
assume an even broader and more flexible character than when
only a private controversy is at stake." 139

Pursuant to these

equitable powers, the Court may appoint a person to assist in
40
administering an equitable remedy.1
If the special master is appointed, the State has set forth the
parameters of the abatement it will seek. Contrary to the
erroneous statement and reports that the State is seeking full
scale removal of all lead paint from all buildings in the State of
Rhode Island, 4 1 the State instead seeks an order requiring
Defendants to administer and operate programs for the citizens of
Rhode Island that would "assist in the remediation and abatement
1989)); Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1110 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that
"the hallmarks of equity have long been flexibility and particularity").
138. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (citing
Virginian R. Co. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)).
139. See also United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 383
(1965) ("Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give
and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are
accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.").
140. See Warwick Sch. Comm. v. Warwick Teachers' Union Local 915, 613
A.2d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 1992) (Court "may appoint one or more special masters
or mediators to assist in the implementation and facilitation of such
negotiations."); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.3d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, ("[Rule 53 does not terminate or modify the district court's
inherent equitable power to appoint a person, whatever be his title, to assist
it in administering a remedy. The power of a federal court to appoint an
agent to supervise the implementation of its decrees has long been
established. Such court-appointed agents have been identified by a confusing
plethora of titles: 'receiver,' 'Master,' 'Special Master,' 'master hearing officer,'
'monitor,' "human rights committee,' 'Ombudsman,' and others. The function
is clear, whatever the title."); United States v. Connecticut, 931 F. Supp. 974,
984 (D. Conn. 1996) ("[b]eyond the provisions of [Rule 53] for appointing and
making references to Masters, a federal district court has the inherent power
to supply itself with [a special master] for the administration of justice when
deemed by it essential." (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
141. See Peter B. Lord, R.L Sets Costs of Lead Clean-Up, THE PROVIDENCE
J., Apr. 5, 2006 at A2 (wherein it was reported that "[tihe paint companies
insist the state is going beyond state and federal policies that call for making
homes lead-safe, rather than lead-free.").

642 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:603
of lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in properties
142
in which they own or reside."
If successful in implementing this statewide abatement of
lead pigments in paints, the result of the prolonged Rhode Island
litigation will be to ensure the future for successive generations.
Children will no longer have to be lead detectors; no child will face
an uncertain future as a result of childhood lead poisoning;
parents and homeowners will be provided with the tools necessary
to inactivate a known toxin in their homes and protect not only
their own children, but every child that comes to live in that home.
In the words of a long-term lead poisoning prevention advocate in
Rhode Island:
"We are absolutely thrilled," said Roberta Hazen
Aaronson, executive director of the Childhood Lead
Action Project, an advocacy group for lead-poisoned
children. "Sometimes in this not so friendly world, the
Goliaths are defeated and justice triumphs. This
precedent-setting decision feels like a home run for the
families devastated by lead poisoning and for a
community that has borne the cost of this industry-made
public health disaster."143
III. NATIONAL TREND APPLYING PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW TO
LEAD PIGMENT CASES
The Rhode Island verdict could presage a national trend
toward greater protection of lead poisoned victims. While the
Defendants and those critical of the Rhode Island suit have
claimed that the suit is "bizarre" and "quirky,"1' the reality is
that the law and the facts of this case are equally applicable in
other jurisdictions. In the last year alone, courts in New Jersey,
Wisconsin and California have all affirmed a governmental
entity's right and obligation to bring a suit on behalf of the public

142. Plaintiffs Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories (Nov. 30, 2004).
143. Peter B. Lord, 3 Companies Found Liable in Lead-Paint Nuisance
Suit, THE PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 23, 2006, at Al.
144. Creswell, supra note 16 ("Three defense lawyers interviewed for this
article said that this was one of the most bizarre lawsuits and trials of their
careers. They blame what they call Rhode Island's quirky public nuisance
laws.")
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to remedy the public nuisance caused by the presence of lead
pigment in paint on buildings in those states. In addition, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has also affirmed the right of an
individual lead poisoned child to sue the lead pigment industry
notwithstanding his inability to identify the manufacturer of the
particular lead pigment he ingested. Each of these decisions
signals a change in the landscape of lead pigment litigation, and
sends a clear message to these and other possible defendants that
they will be held accountable for their actions.
A. New Jersey
In 2000, twenty-six cities and towns in New Jersey brought
suit against manufacturers, sellers, and promoters of lead
pigment seeking to recover costs for detecting and removing lead
paint, providing medical care to lead-poisoned residents and for
developing educational programs. Plaintiffs sought to recover
these expenses through claims based on public nuisance and
several other claims. On November 4, 2002, the motion judge
granted defendants' omnibus motion to dismiss. 145 On August 17,
2005, the New Jersey court reversed the motion judge's dismissal
of the public nuisance cause of action, finding that a municipal
body has a common law right to abate a nuisance by summary
proceedings. 146 In addition, the court concluded, as the Rhode
Island Superior Court did, that a common law public nuisance
claim:
[W]ould not subvert the goals of the [New Jersey] Lead
Paint Statute, and, in fact, such action would foster those
goals. Each remedial tool looks to different responsible
parties. The Lead Paint Statute imposes a duty of
abatement on property owners, while this civil action
demands that the named paint-industry defendants
compensate the cities for their expenditures caused by
defendants' creation of a public nuisance. This civil suit
can proceed on a parallel track that need not ever
intersect with the mechanism set forth in the Lead Paint

145. In Re Lead Paint, 2002 WL 31474528 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. Nov. 4,
2002).
146. In Re Lead Paint,2005 WL 1994172 (N.J. Super. Aug. 17, 2005).
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Statute. The relief demanded in the complaint-funding
future programs and compensating the municipalities for
their abatement and health-care expenses- would not
interfere with the municipalities' ongoing enforcement
efforts under the Lead Paint Statute; their boards of
health remain free to sue property owners for the costs of
removal. And, the State Department of Health may
prosecute disorderly persons complaints against violating
owners. None of the statute's enforcement tools may be
used against manufacturers or distributors. Hence, the
two classes of remedies are complementary, not
147
conflicting or duplicative.
Importantly, as to the applicability of public nuisance law to
lead pigment and lead poisoning claims, the Appellate Division
found that "public health problems such as lead-paint
contamination and illnesses casually linked thereto require the
expenditure of public funds to provide medical diagnostic and
treatment services, particularly to members of the public who
have no access to health coverage or have insufficient resources to
attend to their healthcare needs." 148 Affirming the relevancy of an
abatement remedy, the court also found that "[t]he very presence
of lead paint - even lead paint that is never ingested - has

purportedly caused plaintiffs to incur costs of removing lead paint
and of funding detection and education programs. Thus the
complaint's key proximate cause averment is... Plaintiffs also
allege damages to themselves .... the costs of discovering and
abating Lead.. ."149
The New Jersey case affirmed by the Appellate Division is
pending on appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. 15 0
B. City of Milwaukee
The City of Milwaukee brought suit against NL and Mautz
Paint to recover costs associated with the city's abatement of lead147. Id. at *5.
148. Id. at *13.
149. Id.
150. In reversing the trial court's decision, the appellate court relied in
part on the Rhode Island trial court's decision, signaling that the court's
decisions therein are not quite as "bizarre" as defense counsel have
contended. See id. at *15.
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based paint hazards. The city asserted claims for public nuisance,
conspiracy and restitution, alleging that the defendants were "a
substantial factor in contributing to the community-wide, leadbased public nuisance in Milwaukee."15 1 The defendants moved
for summary judgment, claiming that the City was required to
prove 'at a minimum, that [defendants'] pigment or lead paint. . is
present on windows in . properties and that their conduct
somehow caused the paint to become a hazard to children."152 The
court held "that to establish a claim of creating a public nuisance,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendants' conduct was a
substantial cause of the existence of a public nuisance and that
the nuisance was a substantial factor in causing injury to the
public, which injury is the subject of the action. Finally, public
policy considerations must also be considered because, similar to
liability for negligence, liability for creating a public nuisance can
be limited on public policy grounds."15 3 The court rejected the
defendants' position, finding instead that product identification
and property specific evidence were not required to prove that a
community-wide public nuisance existed or that the defendants
were liable for that nuisance. 5 4 The court agreed, recognizing the
communal harms associated with lead poisoning:
Public nuisance is focused primarily on harm to the
community or the general public ....

[T]he allegation at

its essence is that defendants sold and promoted a
dangerous product to a community and that product
caused a serious public health problem in that
community. The City, rather than only the sick children,
has suffered and sustained an injury. This injury, unlike
injury suffered by individuals, is community-wide and
affects even those whose health is not compromised by
lead-paint poisoning. The City is also the entity most
reasonably able to remedy this community-wide injury to
55
public health.

151. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W. 2d 888, 893 (Wisc.
App. 2004).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 892.
154. Id. at 894.
155. Id. at 893.
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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that allegations
of marketing, promoting, and manufacturing Lead for use in
paints and coatings were sufficient to establish liability for
creating a public nuisance in the absence of product and/or
manufacturer identification. The case is scheduled for trial in
early 2007.
C. California
Just days after the Rhode Island jury reached its verdict, the
California Appeals Court, Sixth District permitted government
entities to pursue a public nuisance cause of action against the
former manufacturers of lead pigments. 56 In that case, "a group
of governmental entities acting for themselves, as class
representatives, and on behalf of the People of the State of
California, filed a class action against a group of lead
manufacturers. 157
This class action suit alleged that the
manufacturers were liable under strict product liability,
negligence and fraud "for damages caused by lead paint."158 The
suit asks for abatement, injunctive relief, restitution and
disgorgement of profits. 159
Like the Rhode Island case, the plaintiffs in the California
case alleged that the presence of lead pigment was a public
nuisance because it "is injurious to the health of the public." 160
Further, as in the Rhode Island case, the complaint alleged that
defendants had created and/or contributed to the creation of the
public nuisance by "[e]ngaging in a massive campaign to promote
the use of Lead on the interiors and exteriors of private residences
and public and private buildings and for use on furniture and toys;
failing to warn the public about the dangers of lead; selling,
promoting and distributing lead; trying to discredit evidence
linking lead poisoning to lead; trying to stop regulation and

156. See County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 137 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d
313 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2006). In addition to reversing the trial court and
reinstating the public nuisance cause of action, the court also reinstated the
plaintiffs' strict liability, negligence and fraud causes of action.
157. Id. at 319.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 319.
160. Id. at 324.
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restrictions on lead; and trying to increase the market for lead." 161

Finally, like Rhode Island, the "remedy sought was abatement
'from all public and private homes and property so affected
' 162
throughout the State of California."

The court first concluded that the complaints identified a
condition that could be considered a public nuisance and that
abatement was an appropriate remedy: "Clearly their complaint
was adequate to allege the existence of a public nuisance for which
these entities, acting as the People, could seek abatement."163 In
considering whether the defendants could be liable for that
nuisance, the court expressly rejected the contention that product
manufacturers could not be held liable for creating a public
nuisance. Instead, the court found:
[A] "representativepublic nuisance cause of action seeking
abatement of a hazard created by affirmative and
knowing promotion of a product for a hazardous use is not
'essentially' a products liability action 'in the guise of a
nuisance action' and does not threaten to permit public
nuisance to 'become a monster that would devour in one
gulp the entire law of tort ....
' Because this type of
nuisance action does not seek damages but rather
abatement, a plaintiff may obtain relief before the hazard
causes any physical injury or physical damage to
property. A public nuisance cause of action is not
premised on a defect in a product or a failure to warn but
on affirmative conduct that assisted in the creation of a
hazardous condition. Here, the alleged basis for
defendants' liability for the public nuisance created by
lead paint is their affirmative promotion of lead paint for
interior use, not their mere manufacture and distribution
64
of lead paint or their failure to warn of its hazards.
The court then went on to find that public nuisance liability
and products liability were not interchangeable claims: "A
products liability action does not provide an avenue to prevent
future harm from a hazardous condition, and it cannot allow a
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 328.
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public entity to act on behalf of a community that has been
subjected to a widespread public health hazard. For these reasons,
we are convinced that the public nuisance cause of action in the
third amended complaint is not a disguised version of plaintiffs'
products liability causes of action ....
The appellate division remanded the case back to the trial
court. As of the time this article was written, the parties were
still awaiting the return of the case to the trial level so that a trial
date could be set.
D. Thomas v. Mallett
The Thomas case is a single plaintiff case brought against the
plaintiffs landlords and against the same lead industry
defendants as the State of Rhode Island sued in its public
nuisance case. 166 The case proceeded against the industry
defendants based on a possible application of the risk contribution
theory of Collins v. Eli Lilly167 which permitted those injured by
DES to recover against the DES manufacturers, despite the
inability of the plaintiff to identify the specific manufacturer of the
DES that caused the injury.
While the case involved different legal theories of liability
than public nuisance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court drew a
number of conclusions that apply in the public nuisance context.
First, the court expressed "serious concerns" with pigment
manufacturers' attempts to displace blame for lead poisoning from
themselves to landlords. 168 Second, the court found that, while
landlords could share in that blame, "landlords are not to blame
for the fact that the lead pigment in the paint is poisonous in the
first instance." 6 9 Third, the court recognized that the pigment
manufacturers "did more than simply contribute to a risk," but
knowingly produced and promoted the harmful product that
created that risk. 70 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
court recognized the communal harm associated with lead

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 329.
See Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
Id. at 552.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 558.
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poisoning: "the problem of lead poisoning...is real[,]it is
widespread and represents "a public health catastrophe that is
poised to linger for quite some time."17 1 This recognition of the

communal harm associated with lead poisoning represented the
crux of Rhode Island's public nuisance claim against the lead
paint manufacturers.
III. CONCLUSION
While the case of State of Rhode Island v. Atlantic Richfield
Company, NL Industries, Inc., Millennium Holdings LLC, and
The Sherwin-Williams Company saw the first successful
application of public nuisance law against the lead pigment
industry for its role in creating a state-wide public health crisis,
this unique tort is solidly rooted in the history of Rhode Island
jurisprudence. The abatement remedy ordered by the jury will
ably supplement the decades of work done by children's health
and housing advocates to battle childhood lead poisoning and raise
awareness about the importance of healthy and safe housing.
Precisely what that remedy will consist of is in the hands of the
trial court and is the subject of more briefing and argument by the
parties. This additional debate over the parties' abatement
proposals, which are worlds apart, is a small delay in what will be
the ultimately triumphant outcome for the people of the State of
Rhode Island: a housing stock that is free of lead and lead
hazards. Additionally, Rhode Island's victory in its public health
lawsuit may be a precursor of things to come in other
jurisdictions. With appellate courts in other states endorsing the
applicability of public nuisance law to lead pigment suits, this
ancient cause of action has found new life in modern
environmental torts. Furthermore, over and above any legal
impact, the fact that, under public nuisance law, other states may
have the opportunity to benefit their citizens by seeking
abatement of lead and lead hazards from their housing is an
important public health victory.

171.

Id.

